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COMMENTS
MORAL RIGHTS FOR ARTISTS UNDER THE LANHAM ACT:
GILLIAM v. AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS.
Artistic works in America generally are accorded inadequate pro-
tection. The Copyright Act', for example, focuses on preserving eco-
nomic rights2 rather than on preserving the artistic integrity of a
work.3 The European doctrine of "droit moral,"4 which purports to
protect the moral, personal rights of creators as distinguished from
their economic rights, has been neither adopted statutorily nor
accepted judicially in the United States.' Therefore, commercial
distribution of a work often requires relinquishing any continued
control over that work,6 thus creating a dilemma for the artist.
In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos.,7 however, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recommended a
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-215 (1970). This title was revised in its entirety by Act of Oct. 19, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 [hereinafter cited as Revision Act], and will become
effective Jan. 1, 1978. See notes 29-32, infra.
2. See notes 27-30 infra & accompanying text.
3. One commentator has said that when an artist creates "he projects into the world part
of his personality and subjects it to the ravages of public use." Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral
Rights: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REv. 554, 557 (1940).
Granting the artist a "right of integrity" would permit him to prohibit or at least to maintain
control over alterations, additions or deletions in content, style, format, etc. of his work.
Comment, Copyright: Moral Right-A Proposal, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 793, 799 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Proposall.
4. See notes 15-24 infra & accompanying text.
5. Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947); Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc.,
295 F. Supp. 331, 340 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc.
570, 575, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 818 (Sup. Ct. 1949). Cf. Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 590-91 (2d
Cir. 1952).
6. Unless the artist's reputation affords him considerable bargaining power, see notes 37-
39 infra & accompanying text, the contract granting use of his copyrighted work probably
will not offer much protection against subsequent distortions or misrepresentations. The
following standard granting clause is illustrative:
Author agrees that Producer shall have the unlimited right to vary, change,
alter, modify, add to and/or delete from the Property and change the sequence
thereof and the characters and the description of characters.. . . Author hereby
waives the benefits of any Provision of law known as "droit moral" . . . and
agrees not to institute . . . any. . . lawsuit. . .[for] defamation or mutilation
of the Property.
Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through Extension of Exist-
ing American Legal Doctrines, 60 GEo. L.J. 1539 (1972), quoting Berman & Rosenthal, Screen
Credit and the Law, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 156, 187-88 (1962).
7. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
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remedy for the moral rights dilemma confronting the American art-
ist. In Gilliam the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) was
charged with mutilating the television scripts of Monty Python, a
British comedy group.' The court granted a preliminary injunction
enjoining future televised broadcasts of the taped programs which
ABC had edited to delete offensive material and to accommodate
commercials.' Although the finding of probable copyright infringe-
ment was sufficient to justify an injunction, 0 the court, in a surpris-
ing opinion, held for the first time,II that distortion of a copyrighted
work is actionable under the Lanham Act. 2 Although recognition of
such a federal right increases protection for artists in America,' it
is still an inadequate substitute for droit moral. 4
DROIT MORAL
Under the doctrine of moral rights or droit moral, Europe long has
acknowledged the artist's right to protect the integrity of his work
and reputation. 5 Essentially, this is a tort doctrine protecting the
honor and reputation of the creator's "personality" as expressed in
his work.'6 Although usually considered a component of European
copyright, moral rights exist independently of the property aspect
of copyright. 7 The term comprises diverse interests having in com-
8. Since 1969, the group has achieved great popularity, primarily through its television
series, "Monty Python's Flying Circus", created and performed for the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC). "Monty Python, as all right-thinking people know by now, is a troupe of
five British writer-actors and one American writer-animator, who would be as funny as any
comparable group in the world if there were a comparable group in the world." Hertzberg,
Onward and Upward with the Arts: Naughty Bits, THE NEW YORKER, March 29, 1976, at 69.
9. 538 F.2d at 19-21.
10. "If any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected under the copyright
laws of the United States such person shall be liable: (a) . . . To an injunction restraining
such infringement;" 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1970). See, e.g.,. Rice v. American Program Bureau,
446 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1971); Beechwood Music Corp. v. Vee Jay Records, Inc., 226 F. Supp.
8 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 328 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1964).
11. 538 F.2d at 26 (Gerfein, J., concurring).
12. Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.). See notes 55-57 infra & accompanying text.
13. See notes 98-104 infra & accompanying text.
14. See notes 104-08 infra & accompanying text.
15. See generally Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 506 (1955);
Katz, The Doctrine of Moral Right and American Copyright Law-A Proposal, 24 S. CAL. L.
REv. 375 (1951).
16. Roeder, supra note 3, at 578.
17. Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 963, 965 (A. Fischer
ed. 1963).
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mon the protection of the artist's personality or "non-patrimonial"
interests. 8
The Berne Convention," a multilateral treaty organization2" that
sets minimum standards for the protection of literary and artistic
works has lucidly articulated the concept of "droit moral."'" The
critical elements are the right to paternity and the right to
integrity.22 The artist's right of authorship, or paternity, encompas-
ses his right to be known to the public as the creator of his work, to
prevent others from usurping his work by naming another as author,
and to prevent others from attributing to him a work that he has
not written or that has been distorted or mutilated.23 The right to
integrity not only enables the artist to prevent unauthorized altera-
tions of his work but also to make desired changes.24
18. Katz, supra note 15.
19. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
amended, Additional Act and Declaration, May 4, 1896 (Paris), revised, Nov. 13, 1908 (Ber-
lin), amended, Additional Protocol to the Revised Berne Convention of 1908, Mar. 20, 1914
(Berne), revised, June 2, 1928 (Rome), revised, June 26, 1948 (Brussels), revised, July 14, 1967
(Stockholm), cited in Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral Right
Through Extension of Existing American Legal Doctrines, 60 GEo. L.J. 1539, 1539 n.2.
20. The United States sent a delegate to the original Berne meeting in 1886, but, despite
pressure by various author groups, has not acceded to the convention. Nimmer, Implications
of the Prospective Revision of the Berne Convention and the United States Copyright Law,
19 STAN. L. REV. 499, 499-500 (1967).
21. The protection afforded moral rights varies considerably from country to country;
consequently, there has not been a uniform incorporation of the doctrine into the copyright
laws of Berne Union members. See Strauss, supra note 17, at 991.
22. These rights are articulated in Article 6 of the Convention as follows:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer
of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work
and to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other
derogatory action in relation to said work, which would be prejudicial to his
honor or reputation.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, June 26, 1948 (Brussels)
art. 6(2), reprinted in 11 UNESCO COPYRIGHT 114 (1948), cited in Comment, Toward Artistic
Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through Extension of Existing American Legal
Doctrines, 60 GEO. L.J. 1539, 1540 n.7.
A third category, the author's right to object to any action that would be prejudicial to his
honor and reputation, was added to the Brussels text but has not been ratified by all of the
member countries. Nimmer, supra note 20, at 520. Other proposed components of the moral
right doctrine include: (a) the right to create a work; (b) the right to publish or not to publish
a work; (c) the right to withdraw a published work from sale; and (d) the right to prevent
excessive criticism of a work. See Strauss, supra note 17, at 970-72.
23. Strauss, supra note 17, at 966.
24. Id. at 968. The scope of this right may be circumscribed by the publication method
chosen. If publication is direct, as by printing, no unauthorized changes are allowed. If the
work is adapted to a different medium, however, as when a play or novel is made into a film,
reasonable changes necessitated by the new medium are permitted. Id.
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PRE-GILLIAM PROTECTION FOR THE ARTIST IN AMERICA
Copyright is the exclusive, legally secured right to publish and sell
the substance and form of a literary, musical, or artistic work.25 As
such, copyright law2" protects the fruits of artistic creation against
economic exploitation.2" The copyright holder owns the right to re-
produce his work; infringement, that is, use of the material without
his permission, requires the payment of damages.2" Consequently,
the only protection afforded by the Federal Copyright Act 25 is com-
25. COPYRIGHT-CURRENT VIEWPOINTS ON HISTORY, LAWS, LEGISLATION 1 (A. Kent & H. Lan-
cour eds. 1972).
26. The United States Copyright Act is codified in title 17 of the U.S. Code, pursuant to
the constitutional directive that Congress has the power "[t]o promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
The present statutory scheme provides that a work becomes subject to copyright upon its
publication. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1970), for a period of 28 years, 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970) with a
possible renewal term of 28 years, U.S.C. § 24 (1970). Prior to publication, the traditional
common law right in intellectual and literary products entitles the proprietor to the exclusive
use of his creation. See generally 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 11 (1976). This common law right
is acknowledged in the statute: "Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit the
right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work at common law or in equity, to
prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent, and
to obtain damages therefor." 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). Divestiture of the common law copyright
occurs upon publication when, by the consent of the copyright owner, the original or tangible
copies of a work are made available to the general public. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §49 supra
at 192-93.
This dual system of protection is eliminated by the Copyright Revision Bill, Act of Oct.
19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, which establishes a single scheme of statutory
protection for all copyrightable works, whether published or unpublished.
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified
by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of
expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by
sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether
published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no
person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under
the common law or statutes of any state.
Revision Act, supra note 1, § 301(a). For works created after January 1, 1978, copyright
protection will commence with creation of the work and endure for a term equivalent to the
life of the author plus fifty years. Revision Act, supra note 1, § 302.
27. Roeder, supra note 3, at 557. Notably, the statute protects "works of authorship", not
the "copyright owner." Proposal, supra note 3, at 809.
28. Note, The Doctrine of Droit Moral: Its Place in American Copyright Law, 16 HOWARD
L.J. 539, 550 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Droit Moral]. The statute provides that the infrin-
ger must: "pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as the copyright proprietor may have
suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the infringer shall have made
from such infringement .... " 17 U.S.C. § 101 (b).
29. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-215 (1970). Although the Revision Act does give some
recognition of the integrity of an artistic work, see Proposal, supra note 3, at 810; Nimmer,
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pensation for specific economic harm. 0 Once an artist sells or leases
his copyright, his contract determines any further rights of control
over his creation.3 1
Although no basis for vindication of artists' personal rights exists
in the statutory copyright law, 3 American courts have granted lim-
ited relief for mutilation or misrepresentation of artistic works under
state common law doctrines.33 Using this approach, the initial focus
is on general principles of contract law. For example, although an
author apparently does not have an inherent right to publication of
his name in connection with his work, 34 even absent a specific con-
supra note 20, at 518 & n.107, the doctrine of moral right is not expressly adopted.
30. Droit Moral, supra note 28, at 550. Thus, copyright law will prevent A from reprinting
the work of B without permission, giving B a limited monopoly on work that can be exploited
for B's economic advantage; however, it apparently will not prevent C the authorized pub-
lisher, from publishing it in a manner harmful to B's honor and reputation as an author.
Roedersupra note 3, at 557. Moreover, a distortion of the work in connection with a use
constituting copyright infringement is probably insufficient to support a cause of action
independent of the infringement claim. See Haines v. Tops Music Enterprises Inc., 160 F.
Supp. 77, 80-85 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (semble).
31. Droit Moral, supra note 28, at 551; Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing
Moral Right Through Extension of Existing American Legal Doctrines, 60 GEO. L.J. 1539,
1556-58 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Artistic Integrity].
The Revision Act does afford the author limited control over transferred copyrights through
the concept of a "termination interest". That is, an author may terminate the transfer or
license of a copyright "at any time during a period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-
five years from the date of execution of the grant .... " Revision Act, supra note 1, § 203(a)
(3). The implication seems to be that an author may terminate his grant of copyright within
the designated period if he believes that the copyright transferee has violated his personal
rights in the work. Proposal, supra note 27 at 810. As one commentator has observed, however,
the right to prevent distortion of a work is meaningless when bestowed upon an author. after
the public has been exposed to the mutilated form for so many years. See Artistic Integrity,
supra note 31, at 1558.
32. See notes 25-31, supra & accompanying text.
33. See generally 1 NIMMER ON CoPYIGrr, supra note 26, §§ 110.2-110.6. As indicated
previously, section 301 (a) of the Revision Act adopts a single system of federal statutory
copyright, thus preempting any state laws "in the nature of copyright". See note 1 supra.
The section further provides that such federal preemption shall not annul or limit any rights
or remedies under state law with respect to "activities violating legal or equitable rights that
are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106." Revision Act, supra note 1, at § 301 (b)(3). Although the House
Judiciary Committee deleted a final clause of this section enumerating illustrative examples
of causes of action, the Committee Report emphasizes that rights and remedies outside the
scope of, or different in nature from, federal copyright may continue to be protected under
State common law or statute. H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 131-32, reprinted
in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6131, 6176-78. Apparently, therefore, the new
Copyright Act does not vitiate state protection of moral rights. Accord, Nimmer, supra note
20, at 519; Proposal, supra note 3, at 810-11.
34. See, e.g., Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947) (court will not
presume artist's right to credit for paintings; right must be clearly imposed by contract); De
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tractual provision, an artist who sells or licenses his work may be
able to prove that the intent of the parties was to give credit for
authorship.' 5 Similarly, a breach of contract theory may be avail-
able to protect the integrity of an artistic creation. " Unfortunately,
courts have tended to interpret narrowly the contract rights retained
by the author. 7 Thus, unless an artist's reputation affords him con-
Bekker v. Frederick A. Stokes Co., 168 App. Div. 452, 153 N.Y.S. 1066, (2d Dep't), aff'd per
curiam, 114 N.E. 1064 (Ct. App. 1916) (mem.) (no contractual stipulation for credit-line on
musical encyclopedia). But see Harms, Inc. v. Tops Music Enterprises, 160 F. Supp. 77, 83
(S.D. Cal. 1958) (dicta) (publisher may not omit author's name unless expressly granted this
right by contract). Nimmer has suggested that this dictum is inaccurate, because the reported
cases indicate that "it is an author who must reserve the right to receive credit by contract,
not the purchaser who must obtain contractual immunity from the obligation to give credit."
1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 26, § 110.5.
35. See Clemens v. Press Pub. Co., 67 Misc. 183, 122 N.Y.S. 206 (Sup. Ct. App. Term
1910).
If the intent of the parties was that the defendant should purchase the rights
to the literary property and publish it, the author is entitled not only to be
paid for his work, but to have it published in the manner in which he wrote it.
The purchaser cannot garble it or put it out under another name than the
author's; nor can he omit altogether the name of the author, unless his contract
with the latter permits him so to do.
Id. at __, 122 N.Y.S. at 208 (Seaburg, J., concurring).
An author also might be able to establish such a contractual right to credit based upon
custom and usage. See Poe v. Michael-Todd Co., 151 F. Supp. 801, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); cf.
Jones v. American Law Book Co., 125 App. Div. 519, 109 N.Y.S. 706, 710 (1908).
36. See, e.g., Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 588 (2d Cir. 1952) (contract provision requiring
record manufacturer to use legend "Presented by Norman Granz" carried implied duty not
to sell records creating a false representation); Curwood v. Affiliated Distrib. Inc., 283 F. 219,
222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1922) (sale of motion picture included right to elaborate on plaintiff's story,
but imposed obligation on defendant to retain and give appropriate expression to theme,
thought, and main action of story); Manners v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 262 F. 811, 813-
15 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (exclusive license to produce a play provided that its alterations, elimina-
tions, or additions be made without author's consent; there could be no substantial deviation
from locus of play or order and sequence of plot); De Bekker v. Frederick A. Stokes Co., 168
App. Div. 452, __, 153 N.Y.S. 1066, 1068 (Sup. Ct. 1915), aff'd per curiam, 219 N.Y. 573,
114 N.E. 1046 (1916) (mem.) (sale of right to publish encyclopedic work did not include right
to alter title or format); Royle v. Dillingham, 53 Misc. 383, -, 104 N.Y.S. 783, 784 (Sup.
Ct. 1907) (unauthorized changes enjoined because author explicitly'reserved right to super-
vise production of his play).
37. See, e.g., Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 1968)
(assignment of motion picture rights held to include television rights: "[i]f the words are
broad enough to cover the new use, it seems fairer that the burden of framing and negotiating
an exception should fall on the grantor"); Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc., 205 Cal. 2d 441, 23 Cal. Rptr. 14, 17-18 (D. Cal. App. 1962) (contract granting
motion picture rights "based substantially on the same story" and prohibiting "material"
changes held to confer right to update and modernize); Preminger v. Columbia Pictures
Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 363, 267 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd 25 App. Div. 2d 830, 269 N.Y.S.2d
913 (1st Dep't), aff'd 18 N.Y.2d 659, 219 N.E. 2d 431, 273 N.Y.S.2d 80 (Ct. App. 1966) (license
to show motion picture on television included implicit right, in view of custom in trade, to
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siderable bargaining power,3" his copyright contract probably will
not guarantee significant control over his work. 9
As an alternative, some American artists have sued in tort. The
theory of defamation, which seeks to redress injury to reputation,
seems ostensibly appropriate, and has received some support from
the courts." Problems inherent in applying this theory to the issue
of artistic integrity, however, have resulted in inadequate protec-
tion. The artist is denied any immediate relief because an injunction
will not issue for restraint of a personal libel.4 Moreover, proving
libel may be difficult, especially if a work is in the public domain
and may be freely published, copied or compiled by others.2 Fi-
nally, to prevail it is often necessary that the artist show special
damages."
cut and edit). Cf. Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, __, 89 N.Y.S.2d
813, 819 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (artist retained no rights to protection of his reputation after uncondi-
tional sale of his work; court admonished that time for reservation of rights was upon execut-
ing the contract).
38. See, e.g., Royle v. Dillingham, 53 Misc. 383, 104 N.Y.S. 783 (Sup. Ct. 1907); Herne v.
Liebler, 73 App. Div. 194, 76 N.Y.S. 762 (1902).
39. See Artistic Integrity, supra note 31, at 1539-41.
40. See Seroff v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 6 Misc. 2d 383, 162 N.Y.S.2d 770 (1957) in which
the plaintiff sued in libel, claiming damage to his professional reputation as a result of an
allegedly distorted French translation of his book. The court denied a recovery against plain-
tiff's publisher, the only defendant in the case, holding that its duty was discharged upon
sale of the translation right to an independent, foreign publisher. Implicit in the decision,
however, is recognition of a probable cause of action in libel against the French publisher and
translator. Id. at __, 162 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
41. E.g., Kuhn v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 29 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Krebiozen
Research Foundation v. Beacon Press, Inc., 334 Mass. 86, 134 N.E.2d 1, cert. denied, 352 U.S.
848 (1956); Kwass v. Kersey, 139 W. Va. 497, 81 S.E.2d 237 (1954).
42. See Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575
(1948), aff'd mem., 225 App. Div. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1940): Soviet composers alleged the
misuse of their work as background music for a spy movie whose anti-Soviet theme they found
objectionable. The court refused to find that use of plaintiff's names and music necessarily
implied their approval of the movie, thus casting upon them the false imputation of disloyalty
to their country. 196 Misc. at __, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
43. Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299 N.Y.S. 188 (Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd mem., 253 App.
Div. 887, 2 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1st Dep't 1938) (alleged libelous news broadcast falsely attributed
to plaintiff held to be slander, requiring allegation of special damages, which plaintiff had
failed to allege). Cf. D'Altomonte v. New York Herald Co., 154 App. Div. 453, 456, 139 N.Y.S.
200, 203 (1st Dep't 1913) (Scott, J., dissenting):
[The plaintiff] alleges no special damage. If, therefore, he can sustain the first
count in his complaint, it must be because the article is libelous per se. Mere
falsity in a writing . . . does not constitute a libel. It must go further, and tend
to disgrace the person written about, or bring him into ridicule or contempt
... . We cannot find in the article anything tending in any wise to injure the
plaintiff's reputation, except perhaps as a skillful writer of fiction, but no case
has yet gone so far as to hold that it is libelous per se to attribute to a writer an
inelegant literary style.
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Similarly, invasion of privacy focuses on damage to reputation,44
and as such protects the artistic work itself only tangentially. 5 Fur-
thermore, if the right of privacy exists under a state statute, plain-
tiff must prove that the defendant's unauthorized use of his name
was made for trade purposes,46 rather than for purposes of news.47
Such statutes have been construed strictly" and thus limit the effec-
tiveness of a privacy theory as a safeguard for moral rights.
A final tort theory recognized by some courts49 as a possible vehi-
cle for the protection of personal rights is unfair competition. The
basis of this doctrine is the wrongful appropriation of credit earned
by another. 0 Although the theory usually is applied to commercial
dealings between competitors," the absence of market competition
44. The right to privacy only recently has been viewed as encompassing an individual's
right to protect the proprietary interest in his reputation. This concept is enunciated by
Prosser as the "false light theory", the right to prevent oneself from being misrepresented to
the public. See Artistic Integrity, supra note 31, at 1548-49, nn. 57 & 58, citing Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 398-401, 406-07(1960).
45. Id. at 1549-50.
46. See Neyland v. Home Pattern Co., 65 F.2d 363 (2d Cir.), cert.denied sub nom. Curtis
Pub. Co. v. Neyland, 290 U.S. 661 (1933); Gieseking v. Urania Records, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d 1034,
155 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Eliot v. Jones, 66 Misc. 95, 120 N.Y.S. 989 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
mem., 140 App. Div. 911, 125 N.Y.S. 1119 (1st Dep't 1910).
47. D'Altomonte v. New York Herald Co., 154 App. Div. 453, 139 N.Y.S. 200 (1st Dep't),
modified in part and aff'd mem., 208 N.Y. 596, 102 N.E. 1101 (Ct. App. 1913).
48. Roeder, supra note 3, at 576.
49. E.g., Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 588 (2d Cir. 1952); Harms, Inc. v. Tops Music
Enterprises, Inc. 160 F. Supp. 77, 81-83 (S.D. Cal. 1958). Prouty v. National Broadcasting
Co., 26 F. Supp. 265, 266 (D. Mass. 1939). Cf. Gardella v. Log Cabin Products Co., 89 F.2d
891, 895-96 (2d Cir. 1937).
50. One of the earliest enunciations of this doctrine was by Mr. Justice Holmes in
International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918):
Property depends upon exclusion by law from interference, and a person is not
excluded from using any combination of words merely because someone has
used it before, even if it took labor and genius to make it. If a given person is to
be prohibited from making the use of words that his neighbors are free to make
some other ground [than property] must be found. One such ground is vaguely
expressed in the phrase unfair trade. This means that the words are repeated
by a competitor in business in such a way as to convey a misrepresentation that
materially injures the person who first used them, by appropriating credit of
some kind which the first user has earned.
Id. at 246-47.
51. See, e.g., Fischer v. Star Co., 231 N.Y. 414, 132 N.E. 133, cert. denied, 257 U.S. 654
(1921). Plaintiff was the creator of the "Mutt and Jeff" comic strip in San Francisco. A New
York newspaper hired an artist to produce a second strip entitled "Mutt and Jeff", and upon
suit by Fischer the Court enjoined publication.
If appellant's employees can so imitate the work of the respondent that the
admirers of "Mutt and Jeff" will purchase the papers containing the imitations
of the respondent's work, it may result in the public tiring of the "Mutt and
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is not necessarily fatal.5" Mere appropriation of a literary property,
however, is not actionable. Allegations of misrepresentation or de-
ception of the public are also required,53 thus presenting problems
of proof that may be insurmountable. 4
Finally, recent cases evince some support for vindication of an
artist's "moral rights" under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a
federal statute providing a remedy for false designation of origin or
any false description or representation." The provision usually is
Jeff" cartoons by reason of inferior imitations or otherwise, and in any case in
financial damage to respondent and an unfair appropriation of his skill and the
celebrity acquired by him in originating, producing and maintaining the charac-
ters and figures so as to continue the demand for further cartoons in which they
appear.
231 N.Y. at __, 132 N.E. at 139.
52. Prouty v. National Broadcasting Co., 26 F. Supp. 265, 266 (D. Mass. 1939) ("It is the
injury to the author and [the] fraud upon the reading public that constitute the real offense
alleged."). See also Vogue v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509 (6th Cir. 1924):
[Unfair competition] is nothing but a convenient name for the doctrine that
no one should be allowed to sell his goods as those of another. This rule is usually
invoked when there is an actual market competition between the analogous
products of the plaintiff and the defendants, and so it has been natural enough
to speak of it as the doctrine of unfair competition; but there is no fetish in the
word 'competition'. The invocation of equity rests more vitally upon the un-
fairness.
Id. at 512.
53. Harms, Inc. v. Tops Music Enterprises, Inc., 160 F. Supp. at 83-84; Continental Cas.
Co. v. Beardsley, 151 F. Supp. 28, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n. v. Wagner-
Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 792, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 489 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd
mem., 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't. 1951).
54. See Gardella v. Log Cabin Products Co., 89 F.2d 891, 896-98 (2d Cir. 1937) (discussing
relevant evidence for proof of confusion or deception in unfair competition action).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a) (1970). E.g., Rich v. RCA Corp., 390 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(recent picture of plaintiff on cover of album containing songs recorded years ago created false
impression that songs were new); Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 274,
279 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (German film bearing plaintiff's name as author and director was alleg-
edly mutilated and garbled by United States distributor); Geisel v. Poynter Products Inc.,
283 F. Supp. 261, 266-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (well known author had cause of action against
defendant whose advertising and sales representations conveyed impression that its products
were either designed, manufactured or authorized by plaintiff); Yameta Co. v. Capitol
Records, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 582, 586-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (record producer restrained from
using musician's name and picture on album cover in such a way as to create false impression
that musician was principal performer rather than merely accompanist). Cf. L'Aiglon Ap-
parel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 650-51 (3d Cir. 1954) (defendant used picture
of plaintiff's more expensive dress to advertise defendant's cheaper dress). See also Autry v.
Republic Prod., Inc., 213 F.2d 667, 669-70 (9th Cir. 1954) (for distortion of artist's work, court
acknowledged possible action under Lanham Act, in proper circumstances).
Although one court has said that the Lanham Act constitutes a federal remedy against a
particular kind of unfair competition that the common law had protected effectively, Norman
M. Morris Corp. v. Weinstein, 466 F.2d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1972), the Act is not a mere
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invoked against the use in interstate commerce of a trademark that
is likely to cause confusion or to deceive purchasers regarding the
goods' source of origin.5" Because of the statute's remedial nature,
however, it has been construed broadly. 7 Prior to Gilliam, how-
ever, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act never had been applied to an
artistic work bearing a valid copyright. 5
GILLIAM V. AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS.
The scripts in Gilliam originally were written and performed by
Monty Python59 for the British Broadcasting Company (BBC), pur-
suant to a scriptwriters' agreement that retained for the group maxi-
mum control over the scripts and prohibited any editing by BBC
once the programs were recorded.'" The agreement also granted to
BBC the right to license television broadcasts of the programs in
overseas territories. This right was exercised in 1973 when Time-Life
Films acquired a license to distribute certain Monty Python pro-
grams in the United States. The contract between BBC and Time-
Life, however, authorized editing for the insertion of commercials,
adjustment to time segment requirements, and conformity with
codification of common law principles. Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg
Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155, 158 (D.N.Y. 1959).
Section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods
or services, . . . a false designation of origin, or any false description or represen-
tation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent
the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce...
shall be liable to a civil action by any person . . . who believes that he is or is
likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description ...
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970).
56. Mortellito v. Nina of Cal., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
57. Geisel v. Poynter, 283 F. Supp. 261, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Thus, in actions for false
designation, the plaintiff need not allege direct competition between products, Mortellito v.
Nina of Cal. Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); prove that the falsification
occurred willfully and with intent to deceive, Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co.,
255 F.2d 641, 648-49 (3d Cir. 1958); or prove that it involved a registered trademark, Apollo
Distrib. Co., v. Apollo Imports, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 455, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
58. The Gilliam plaintiffs alleged infringement of their common law copyright in the un-
published script of the television program. The court, however, did not preclude the trial
court from finding on remand that broadcast of the recorded program constituted publication,
thus divesting the common law copyright. See note 26 supra.
59. See note 8 supra.
60. 538 F.2d at 17 & n.2. Although the BBC had final editing authority over the scripts, to
prevent involvement in legal action, Monty Python retained optimum control consistent with
BBC's authority. Only minor changes could be made without prior consultation with the
group or its representative. Monty Python also retained all rights in the scripts not specifi-
cally granted to BBC. Id.
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applicable censorship rules.6 In 1975, ABC contracted with Time-
Life" to broadcast two ninety-minute specials" and deleted twenty-
four of the original ninety minutes in each." After viewing a tape of
the first special, Monty Python filed suit 5 seeking damages and an
injunction preventing the second broadcast. Although finding that
the plaintiffs had established both impairment of the integrity of
their work and irreparable harm, the district court denied the in-
junction.6 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed and remanded the case, directing the issuance of a prelimi-
nary injunction. 7
The appellate court first justified this holding by concluding that,
in a subsequent trial on the merits, plaintiffs probably would suc-
ceed in proving their copyright infringement claim. s The court con-
ceded that Monty Python owned the common law copyright in the
unpublished scripts, 9 that the group had granted a limited license
to BBC,7 and that any use that exceeded the terms of the script-
61. Id. at 17-18. No comparable provision appeared in the scriptwriters' agreement between
Monty Python and BBC. Id.
62. Monty Python approved neither this contract between ABC and Time-Life nor the
BBC-Time-Life agreement. Brief for Appellees at 13-14.
63. Each special consisted of three thirty-minute Monty Python shows not previously seen
in the United States. Id. at 18.
64. ABC alleged that the editing was done to allow time for commercials and to delete
offensive or obscene material. Id.
65. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., Civil No. 75-6254 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1975)
(unpublished opinion).
66. 538 F.2d at 18. The district court cited several grounds for its decision: uncertainty both
about plaintiffs' ultimate success on the copyright infringement claim and about whether
BBC and Time-Life were indispensable parties, concern that an injunction would result in
substantial injury to ABC, and a belief that Monty Python was guilty of laches. Id.
67. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 26 (2d Cir. 1976). Prior to the
appellate hearing ABC aired its second special, carrying a legend that the program had been
edited by ABC. The district court had ordered ABC to broadcast an announcement that
Monty Python disassociated itself from the program, but the Second Circuit granted a stay
of that order pending the appeal.
68. Id. at 19, 23.
69. Id. at 19-20. See Brief for Appellees at 23 and note 26 supra. The court did raise the
possibility, ignored by ABC, that broadcast of the recorded program might constitute publi-
cation, so as to divest the common law copyright. 538 F.2d at 19-20 n.3. See note 26 supra.
70. 538 F.2d at 20-21. As noted in an earlier case:
[Tihe Copyright Act confers upon the copyright owner several separate and
distinct rights, such as the right to publish, print and market the copyrighted
work, the right to dramatize it, the right to novelize it, etc. Each of these
separate rights may be transferred in its entirety to another, or a limited interest
in the right . . . may be transferred. . ..
A person to whom has been transferred only a limited right is a mere licen-
see. . ..
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writers' agreement was an infringement.7 The court devoted most
of the opinion to the infringement claim, emphasizing that "the
copyright law should be used to recognize the important role of the
artist in our society and the need to encourage production and dis-
semination of artistic works by providing adequate legal protection
for one who submits his work to the public."72
Apparently, however, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
did not conclude that the copyright law does in fact adequately
protect the American artist,73 because the court endorsed a second
course of action under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act7" for
"mutilation" of an artistic work.75 In corroboration of its endorse-
ment of a cause of action other than that under the Copyright Act,
the court cited three cases in which other courts had recommended
relief for misrepresentation of an artistic work based upon common
law theories outside the statutory scheme.7" To illustrate recovery
Field v. True Comics, 89 F. Supp. 611, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
BBC's license did include the right to produce a "derivative work" - the recorded program,
which was itself subject to copyright. The protection afforded the derivative work, however,
does not affect the scope or ownership of the underlying work. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
§ 7 (1970), providing in pertinent part:
[Aldaptations, arrangements, dramatizations .. .or other versions of ...
copyrighted works when produced with the consent of the proprietor of the
copyright in such works. . . shall be regarded as new works subject to copyright
; but the publication of any such new works shall not affect the force or
validity of any subsisting copyright upon the matter employed or any part
thereof, or be construed to imply an exclusive right to such use of the original
works, or to secure or extend copyright in such original works.
The Revision Act contains a similar derivative works provision. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2545 (17 U.S.C. § 103). See also 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 26,
§§ 39, 41, 45.
71. 538 F.2d at 20-21. The court found that because a grantor may not convey greater rights
than it owns, BBC's grant to Time-Life, and hence to ABC, permitting editing, was a nullity.
Id. at 21.
72. Id. at 23. (emphasis supplied).
73. See notes 25-31 supra & accompanying text.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970). See notes 55-57 supra & accompanying text.
75. The court in Gilliam acknowledged that this cause of action, seeking redress for defor-
mation of an artistic work, originated in the European concept of droit moral, a doctrine not
accepted by American copyright law. "Nevertheless, the economic incentive for artistic and
intellectual creation that serves as the foundation for American copyright law . ..cannot
be reconciled with the inability of artists to obtain relief for mutilation or mispresentation of
their work to the public on which the artists are financially dependent." 538 F.2d. at 24.
In view of the relatively weak precedent for this significant holding, it is surprising that
the court did not discuss the issue more extensively. Perhaps the majority felt that the
substantial likelihood of success on the copyright claim rendered lengthy discussion of the
Lanham Act problem unnecessary.
76. Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952); Gardella v. Log Cabin Prod. Co., 89 F.2d
891 (2d Cir. 1937); Prouty v. National Broadcasting Co., 26 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1939).
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under contract law,77 the court cited Granz v. Harris."9 The court's
reliance on Granz as evincing vindication of artists' personal rights
through a supplementary cause of action appears unwarranted,
however, in that the court in Granz conceded no protection for the
artist beyond the express terms of the contract. In that case, plain-
tiff, a well known producer of jazz concerts, had sold master phono-
graphic recordings" of a concert to the defendant, pursuant to a
contract requiring that records manufactured from the masters be
sold using the credit-line "Presented by Norman Granz." The de-
fendant reproduced the recordings on shorter playing records, thus
deleting eight minutes of music and some audience reaction. The
court held that, absent contractual restrictions, the buyer lawfully
could use the recordings to produce and sell an abbreviated record,
provided it was not attributed to the seller."0 Therefore, it was only
because of the contractual provision specifically requiring attribu-
tion and not because of the court's acknowledgement of the artist's
inherent personal right to prevent distortion of his work, that sale
of the truncated records under the credit-line was a false representa-
tion and consequently a breach of contract. Because the majority
thus grounded its holding solely on a contract theory, Granz does
not corroborate the proposition that American courts either can or
do uphold artists' moral rights."'
77. See notes 33-39 supra & accompanying text. The relief sought by plaintiff was rescis-
sion of the contract, damages for its breach, an accounting of profits, and a permanent
injunction against future sales. 198 F.2d at 586.
78. 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952).
79. The recordings were not copyrighted. 198 F.2d at 589 (Frank, J., concurring). Plaintiff
had argued before the trial court that he retained a "common law property right" in the
musical production, but the district court held that any such right did not survive his sale of
the master recordings. 98 F. Supp. at 910.
80. 198 F.2d at 588. If the purchaser of the recordings falsely had described his abbreviated
version of the music as being presented by the seller-producer he would have committed the
tort of unfair competition. Id. See notes 49-54 supra & accompanying text.
81. The court in Granz, however, arguably did recognize the artist's personal rights in that
in dicta it apparently endorsed an action for unfair competition if a work is attributed to the
author but presented to the public in a distorted form. 198 F.2d at 588 (dicta). Moreover,
Judge Frank, concurring, discussed the artists' moral rights doctrine and opined that tradi-
tional American jurisprudence offers comparative protection. Id. at 589-91 (Frank, J., concur-
ring). As Judge Frank noted:
Whether the work is copyrighted or not, the established rule is that, even if the
contract with the artist expressly authorizes reasonable modifications (e.g.,
where a novel or stage play is sold for adaptation as a movie), it is an actionable
wrong to hold out the artist as author of a version which substantially departs
from the original.
Id. at 589 (Frank, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
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As an additional example of a court's recognition of the artist's
personal rights in his work, the court in GiUiam cited Prouty v.
National Broadcasting Co. 2 in which the plaintiff recovered under
the theory of unfair competition. 3 There, the defendant appropri-
ated the plot and main characters of plaintiff's copyrighted novel
by using, without the author's consent, the name of the characters
in its own radio skits. The plaintiff alleged that this unfair use of
plaintiff's creative ability threatened her established good will and
reputation as an author. In holding that the complaint stated an
actionable claim, however, the court in Prouty emphasized the fac-
tors of deception to the public and monetary damage to the author, 4
rather than the artist's intrinsic moral right to prevent misrepresen-
tation of his work.
Apparently to counter the proprietary language of these opinions,
the court in Gilliam also cited Gardella v. Log Cabin Products,5
which had stated that the gravamen of an unfair competition claim
is injury to professional reputation.8 Even assuming the validity of
the statement, 7 the facts in Gardella render any analogy to the
Gilliam situation questionable. In Gardella, plaintiff was a well
known performer under the stage name "Aunt Jemima"; defendant
possessed the right under a registered trademark to use the same
name in conjunction with its pancake flour. Plaintiff alleged not
only that defendant had traded on her reputation by "passing off"
another actress as "Aunt Jemima", but also that the inferior imita-
tion impaired her professional reputation. The Gardehla court recog-
nized a possible action for unfair competition but found insufficient
evidence in the record to prove confusion or deception of the pub-
82. 26 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1939).
83. See notes 49-54 supra & accompanying text.
84. 26 F. Supp. at 266. The Second Circuit acknowledged that although this decision did
in fact vindicate personal artistic rights, it was couched in property terms. As one commenta-
tor observed:
The doctrine of unfair competition . . . is designed to protect economic rights.
The very name suggests exploitation. . . . That the doctrine is capable of infi-
nite expansion cannot be doubted, but it seems incongruous to expand it to the
protection of purely personal rights. The theory of unfair competition depends
upon the fortuitous fact that to present a deformed work to the public may
economically injure the creator by depriving him of his market; it does not
satisfy the basic needs of the creator or of society. ...
Roeder, supra note 3, at 567-68 (footnotes omitted).
85. 89 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1937).
86. Id. at 895-96.
87. This opinion appears to blur the distinctions between unfair competition and defama-
tion.
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lic."" In Gilliam, however, there was no "passing off"; ABC had
purchased the right to use Monty Python's work and had properly
credited the group with authorship.
Designating section 43(a) of the Lanham Act a "federal counter-
part to state unfair competition laws""5 the court then examined
those cases that expressly had considered section 43(a).'" Although
these cases more nearly address the artists' moral rights dilemma
and as such provide some corroboration for vindicating these rights
through the Lanham Act, they do not hold, as the court in Gilliam
did, that the Lanham Act may be used to redress "mutilation" of
an artist's works. For example, in Geisel v. Poynter Products, Inc."
the court issued an injunction not because of deformation of the
artist's work, but rather because any representation, even though
technically true, may violate the Act if it creates a false impression
about the product's origin.2 In Rich v. RCA Corp.," RCA had re-
leased an album in 1974 containing songs recorded by Charlie Rich
ten to fourteen years earlier. Because in 1974 Rich was under con-
tract to CBS and had an entirely different image, he sought an
injunction under section 43(a). The court awarded the injunction
upon concluding that use of a current likeness of Rich on the album
jacket created the false impression that the songs were new, and
that continuance of such deceptive packaging would cause loss of
customers to CBS and damage to Rich's reputation." Therefore,
Rich also does not support the holding in Gilliam that the Lanham
Act may be used to redress "mutilation" of an author's works; no
such mutilation occurred in Rich, rather, merely a deception that
the old songs were new ones. Similarly, in Autry v. Republic Pro-
ductions, Inc."5 another case cited in Gilliam, the court expressly
declined to decide whether defendant's "emasculation" of certain
motion pictures, so as to render them substantially different from
the artist's finished product, would be actionable under the Lan-
88. 89 F.2d at 896-98. Apparently ABC's legend on its Monty Python special, acknowledg-
ing its editing, similarly would preclude proof of deception.
89. 538 F.2d at 24.
90. See notes 55-57 supra & accompanying text.
91. 283 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Defendant company was enjoined from using plain-
tiff's trade name, Dr. Seuss, in advertising and packaging its dolls.
92. Id. at 267.
93. 390 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
94. Id. at 531.
95. 213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1954).
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ham Act." Moreover, in Jaeger v. American International Pictures,
Inc. ,' though the court at least recognized a possible cause of action
under the Lanham Act," it denied plaintiff's request for a prelimi-
nary injunction because of serious doubts as to his ultimate success
on the merits.9" As such, there was no apparent authority for using
the Lanham Act to protect the artists' works from deformation.
Thus, the award of a preliminary injunction to the Gilliam plain-
tiffs, insofar as it was based upon impairment of artistic integrity
and misrepresentation to the public of the group's talents,'"' is a
significant extension of prior case law and should result in greater
protection for the American artist.
CONCLUSION
Gilliam is notable for two reasons. First, the court in its opinion
not only recognized the distinction between an artist's property
rights in his creation and his personal or moral rights in that same
work' "' but also acknowledged that our economically based copy-
right law does not adequately protect these moral rights.' "' Second,
the court in Gilliam held that the Lanham Act, or trademark stat-
ute, was applicable in a copyright case." 3 Nonetheless, Gilliam fails
to provide an adequate American substitute for droit moral,0 4 for,
as noted in Judge Gurfein's concurrence, the Lanham Act deals with
misdescription or mislabeling, not with the integrity of the copy-
righted work itself.'05 Therefore, the statutory violation in Gilliam
96. "[Wle can conceive that some such cutting and editing could result in emasculating
the motion pictures so that they would no longer contain substantially the same motion and
dynamic and dramatic qualities [intended by the artist]". Id. at 669.
97. 330 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
98. "It is at least arguable that there is a claim under the Lanham Act ... in the charge
that defendant represents to the public that what the plaintiff had nothing to do with is the
plaintiff's product." Id. at 278.
99. Id. at 280. There was considerable evidence that plaintiff had consented to the changes,
either by written contract, oral agreement, or custom in the industry. Further, the court noted
that to obtain an injunction or to recover more than nominal damages the plaintiff probably
would have to prove that the substitutions were markedly inferior to what he had produced
or were inappropriate. Id.
100. 538 F.2d at 25.
101. "Although such decisions are clothed in terms of proprietary right in one's creation,
they also properly vindicate the author's personal right to prevent the presentation of his work
to the public in a distorted form." Id. at 24.
102. Id. See note 75 supra.
103. See id. at 26 (Gurfein, J., concurring).
104. See notes 15-24 supra & accompanying text.
105. 538 F.2d at 27.
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theoretically could have been cured merely by indicating that the
ABC edited version of the broadcast was not approved by Monty
Python.'"' Moreover, the Act's efficacy in protecting artists is re-
stricted further, inasmuch as the act is inapplicable if a copyright
owner conveys all or part of his right under a contract permitting
alterations.'" 7 Thus, although Gilliam provides the American artist
an additional theory under which he may seek to preserve the per-
sonality of his work, the case also adds to the confusion manifest in
this area of the law. A uniform scheme of protection, comparable
to droit moral, that can protect the integrity of all creative endeav-
ors is still necessary. 08
106. Id. The majority suggested, however, that a disclaimer could not overcome the impres-
sion made by the broadcast on viewers who have no means of comparing the truncated version
with the plaintiffs' original work. Id. at 25 n.13.
107. See notes 37-39 supra & accompanying text.
108. Commentators have suggested various grounds for such protection. See, e.g., Roeder,
supra note 3, at 575-78 (adoption of a personal sui generis tort theory); Comment, Proposal,
supra note 27, at 818-19 (incorporation of personal rights section into the copyright statute);
Artistic Integrity, supra note 31, at 1561-62 (expansion of traditional doctrines of right to
publicity, waste, strict interpretation of author contract, and contractual resumption of au-
thor's right to final approval of material alterations).
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